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https://doi.org/10.1016/j.patter.2020.100039THE BIGGER PICTURE We discuss the implications of thinking about trust in different disciplines, including
artificial intelligence (AI), data science in general, decision making, and user interaction. In particular, the key
point to take away is that trust is a vital component to the computational system when it interacts with hu-
mans (which is always) and that understanding it better allows us to craft better systems and interactions.
We also extend the debate about AI and trust/trustworthiness.
Production: Data science output is validated, understood,
and regularly used for multiple domains/platformsThis brief paper is about trust. It explores the phenomenon from various angles, with the implicit assumptions
that trust can be measured in some ways, that trust can be compared and rated, and that trust is of worth
when we consider entities from data, through artificial intelligences, to humans, with side trips along the
way to animals. It explores trust systems and trust empowerment as opposed to trust enforcement, the cre-
ation of trust models, applications of trust, and the reasons why trust is of worth.First Thoughts as an Introduction
It is not always obvious. Indeed, there is often little in the way our
societies work that would suggest the importance of trust, until
one starts to pay attention, and then, there it is. Luhmann1 points
out that the complexity of everyday life might indeed be reduced
by trust, since it allows us to take certain things as given: that
people do not usually try to harm us, or that the news is accurate
(our examples, not Luhmann’s), for example. As Bok2 notes, so-
cieties without trust will not be successful (see also Lagens-
petz3). It is something most of us use every day, often without
even thinking too hard, andmuch of the time within split seconds
of needing to use it. It can be influenced by seemingly unrelated
things happening around us, often without our realizing, and it
matters.
Trust matters because we use it to make decisions about
things. At the most prosaic level, we might use it to make a de-
cision about buying something, online or in person—something
that research of trust in eCommerce addresses (e.g., see Noor-
ian et al.4 andMcKnight et al.5) Wemight use it to decide whether
to use Uber or Lyft, and when we have done that, we might use it
to decide which driver wewould like to pick us up.6Wemight use
it in ubiquitous systems,7 and we might use it in health care.8 We
might use it to decide whether or not we believe what we read on
Facebook, Twitter, online newspapers, or what we hear from ca-
ble news.9Wemight use it whenmeeting people for the first time,This is an open access article under the CC BY-Nor hiring a babysitter, or building and rebuilding relationships or
collaborations.10,11 We might use it when thinking of our
leaders.12,13 We might use it to determine who to work with to
manage emergencies, or even to determine how much supervi-
sion to give in differing circumstances for different people or or-
ganizations. We might use it in security models.14 We may (or
indeed may not, cf. Cook et al.15) use it simply to determine
who, and how much, to cooperate with in a specific context.16
To summarize, trust matters. For the data scientists among us,
we might use it to rate and rank the data and information we
are using, its quality and veracity, or its provenance, for instance.
If we design or use data collection methods and tools, we may
rank these in terms of their efficacy and trustworthiness. We
may use it in the systemswe design and use it to scan and sense,
for instance, in the worlds of the Internet of Things or sensor
networks.
This paper explores, in an unstructured way, some of the ways
in which trust does matter, where it can be and is applied, how in
some instances it can be measured, subjectively or otherwise,
and where and why it may be useful to consider in the sociotech-
nical world we live in. It is unstructured because it does not have
a single story to tell, or a particular message that is universal
(other than trust is something to which we should be paying
attention). It is further unstructured because trust is such a fasci-
nating andmultifaceted phenomenon that is so highly contextualPATTER 1, June 12, 2020 ª 2020 The Authors. 1
C-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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person (or agent). There is much more that can be and is being
said about trust, and there is no doubt that some of what is
here is incomplete, some is missed, and some, as our own
work (and in some instances speculation), will not be agreed
with by all readers. Nevertheless, we write with the aim that the
reader will gain some new insights, questions, or inspiration
from what is here and explore further in the literature we cite
as well as the extensive literature that exists.
Thoughts about Why Trust Matters
The questions about why trust matters and how it works have
been asked and studied for millennia. That given, you may be
forgiven for thinking that the problems are all solved now. But
here is the thing: people are not predictable, the things they do
sometimes surprise us. Moreover, the way in which we work
together is changing constantly and is nothing like it was only a
few years ago.
While the onset of things like big data and artificial intelligence
(AI) give us potentially deep insights into the ways in which peo-
ple behave in differing circumstances, these are still people and
they still work, play, interact, and share in ways that matter to
them. And they use trust to do it. Working, shopping, playing,
and building relationships online simply adds a different context
to the ways in which they do things. The fact that they are
removed from their ‘‘monkey brain’’ comfort zones in terms of
what they see, how they interpret it, and being unable neces-
sarily to tell if they are speaking to a dog or a person online simply
adds new dimensions to the ways in which trust matters.
However, being taken out of the ‘‘monkey brain’’ comfort zone
only works if the necessary cognitive skills for ‘‘chimp manage-
ment’’17 and critical thinking have been properly developed,
with corresponding ‘‘defense mechanisms’’ to resist confirma-
tion bias18 and digital sortition.19 Otherwise, the opportunity to
exploit basic human psychology has been seized and is still un-
regulated: see, for example, how social media platforms have
used habit-forming techniques to increase usage and screen
time,20 or softening up intended recipients of a message with
preliminary attention-catching hooks that predispose the
recipient to agreeing with the message when they finally
encounter it.21
This manipulation becomes absolutely critical as one moves
from commerce andmarketing to, for example, politics and pub-
lic health. So, theories concerning the social construction of re-
ality have been formulated in sociology for years;22 however,
how that social construction occurs also needs to be under-
stood. A new theory from social psychology, RTSI (Regulatory
Theory of Social Influence),23 suggests that as well as there
being social influence from source to target, there is also social
influence by target from source—that potential targets of social
influence actively seek out potential sources by whom to be
influenced.
Given the systematic and willful denigration of scientific insti-
tutes, educational establishments, and independent press,24
those institutions that could act as guarantors of trustable infor-
mation and mediators of new information have been over-
whelmed by a flood of misinformation. This has left people free
to pick their own facts—to seek out their preferred sources by
whom to be influenced; RTSI therefore partially explains how it2 PATTER 1, June 12, 2020been possible for populist politicians to gaslight entire nations,
which has led to both a collapse in, and displacement of, trust,
i.e., away from traditional institutions requiring engagement
and thought, and toward whoever can commandeer attention
with the foghorn of social media. This has had severe negative
consequences in both public health25 and political health.26
Moreover, trust matters in the digital society and the informa-
tion economy because of their grounding in data and the trans-
parent and equitable use of data. The need to democratize big
data, and not let it be the preserve of corporate, scientific, or po-
litical elites, has been identified for some time. But the respon-
sible (or even ethical) use of big data is still an open issue and
has become increasingly important. Some of the issues to
address here include a mutual agreement not to weaponize
data politically (e.g., to subvert the democratic process by
gerrymandering27) and to collect all the data, not just because
some of it may be ideologically inconvenient or out of an ‘‘obtuse
desire to remain in ignorance.’’28
So, trust still matters. But how can we understand trust in this
context?
Thoughts about How We Can Understand Trust
For all that we have studied it for so long, there are still important
questions that we can ask about how it might be useful to us
now. These might include looking more closely at the questions
we alluded to above. Can we trust these data? Can we trust this
system? What does that even mean, and what are we trusting
it for?
Many years ago, Marsh asked the question: how might we
represent trust in a way that computational systems (back
then, specifically, autonomous agents) might be able to reason
both about and with trust as a concept.16
Since then, we have built on the simpler understanding of
trust, and the accompanying formalization, to include consider-
ation of distrust, mistrust and untrust,29 forgiveness30 and
regret,31 and the application of trust in things from Computer
Supported Cooperative Work32 to digital government33 and
computer security.14
Thoughts about Trust Systems
Our work has led us to the concept of trust systems, because we
have begun to perceive that technology is in many cases an in-
tegral part of the way in which people work and play, and more-
over that technology can often help people do these things. A
trust system is a system in which trust is an enabler, but it means
slightly more than that. Because systems are systems, not
standalone applications, it is where computational tools, hu-
mans, and trust reasoning capabilities come together to accom-
plish something where trust is the enabling factor. We consider it
a triad of three Ps: people, process, and place.
People
We consider that people are central to any endeavor in which
computational systems are deployed. Further, since we are
considering the notion of trust here, we necessarily must also
consider how it relates to humans. At any point in a trust system,
then, people are involved: in any or indeed all of the decision
making of the system itself, guidance of the system, or the
impact of decisions made and actions taken as a result of the
trust deliberations, and potentially more.
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even if not physically present, as part of the system itself.
Process
A Trust System works with trust in order to achieve something: a
decision, a recommendation, the prelude to or necessary re-
quirements for an action, and so on. In order to work with trust,
it is necessary to understand it in some way: Trust models and
algorithms are, in their own contexts, a way of doing this.
Thus, for want of a better word, process describes the way in
which the system makes its deliberations: its algorithm, model,
and representations.
What Does This Look like? There are many different models of
trust in existence, and more arrive seemingly on a daily basis,
such that there is little utility in listing them here. Indeed, while
there have been excellent review papers in the past (see for
instance Jösang et al.34), the field is fast moving, and trust
is, as we have noted, so highly contextual that such reviews
are useful for a limited time and as useful historical records.
The interested reader is referred to the many online sources
for academic work that exists for models that matter to their
own field. Some (many) apply to eCommerce and buying or
selling online, with or without agents to help. Some apply to
the user interface between human and machine. Some are de-
ployed to determine how much credit you might get, or if a
specific purchase is being made by you. Others may be
more esoteric and apply in online stock trading. Some, such
as the Chinese Social Credit system or online models of trust
and reputation for everyone around us, are being deployed
to calculate the behavior and thus reputation of others as if it
is the root of all trust (it is not, but that is a topic for
another time).
As we noted above, in a short paper such as this, there is little
benefit to listing the models that do exist, not least because we
would also not do them credit. The reason that there are somany
has less to do with reinventing the wheel every time a new one
comes out (although to be fair, there is a degree of this) and
more to do with the fact that trust is so contextual, as we will
shortly see, that generic trust models are too vague to be imme-
diately useful while more detailed specific ones are too specif-
ically aimed at a particular context to be useful in others (getting
your agent to bid for a camera online is not the same as choosing
a babysitter).
Place
Trust models are necessarily imperfect representations of the
rich phenomenon humans understand as trust (to be honest,
since trust is rather challenging to isolate, and its workings in hu-
mans are hard to define properly, what we can see from the
computational models is a representation of what trust might
look like, and since we can refine or adapt this contextually,
imperfect is perhaps a little strong). This does not make them
less useful, but we need to consider when and how they work,
and what limits they have. In addition, trust is a highly contextual
phenomenon in humans as well as computational systems. It is
necessary to consider the environmental context that the system
finds itself in when considering trust, because this context
changes all the time and thus so does the potential information
that the system uses.
Place refers to the context of the system. This context defines
when the system is considering its options, where the systemcan work, what assumptions are made about the information
or actions it considers, and the limits of its abilities.
Thinking about Questions
Given that we can think of a trust system in this way, there re-
mains the consideration of how a trust decision is made. It is
worth mentioning here that this is how it works for us, but that
does not mean that it works this way for anyone who has studied
trust in specific contexts. That said, we refer the interested
reader (and watcher) to Onora O’Neill’s work regarding trust in
public life.12,35 One of the examples O’Neill uses in her talk is
that of an elementary school teacher being trusted to teach a
class but not to drive the minibus (for different reasons).
This is important, so it bears repeating again (and again): trust
is a highly contextual, subjective judgment that is made in the
light of available evidence and also need, among other things.
The school teacher example is informative. Wemay trust individ-
uals in one context, for a specific task, but not in others. More
prosaically, we use rather imprecise language to talk about trust,
let alone to define it properly.36,37
We come then to the two most important questions about
trust: How much do we have? and How much do we need?
The first is answered by our process, and the second, in combi-
nation, by person and place. Clearly, there needs to be a subject
we are considering, and this trustee is considered in process and
place. The end result of these calculations, if we can call them
that, is two measures. If the How much do we have is more
than the How much do we need, we have a trusting relationship
for that context (I trust my brother to driveme to the airport), but if
what we have is less than we need, we do not (I do not trust him
to fly the plane).
It is particularly important to note here that just because I do
not have enough trust in the context of flying the plane, it does
not imply that I distrust, or do not trust, my brother.31
As Christian Jensen has pointed out (personal communica-
tion), there is actually a third consideration we can get to simply
because we use measures in our computational trust mecha-
nisms: Who or which is best? That is to say, since we can mea-
sure how much we might trust someone or something, we are
now able to compare them and determine which we trust the
most, or evenwhich ismore trusted in context, whichmay some-
times give counter-intuitive results but nonetheless indicates
something of value.
Thinking about Empowerment and Enforcement
Trust Systems are most useful in determining and supplying
foreground trust data,38,39 whereby the technology helps pro-
vide data that the human can use to make trusting decisions,
without necessarily making those decisions itself. We refer to
this as trust empowerment rather than trust enforcement.38
This is an important distinction, so we take a moment to discuss
it further.
Trust Enforcement: ‘‘Trust This Much because We
Say So’’
Reputation is surely a good thing to have, but it is not the only
thing that matters in trust. In trust enforcement, we, as traditional
knowledge engineers or user interface designers, or simply pro-
fessionals or knowledge aggregators putting together a list of
reputation attributes, do this: grab reputation statistics from
the world around the object in question, put them togetherPATTER 1, June 12, 2020 3
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much as possible from the outside world, and present it to the
subject. We do this and say ‘‘this is the trust value/reputation/
rank of the object. You can trust it this much. These are the
same values for other objects, you can trust them this much.’’
The result is that we the users are given the things we should
trust in the order that they are trustable. Examples of this include
almost every reputation system that exists, including Google’s
own Pagerank,40 which, while constantly rejigged, essentially
does this thing for web objects. It also includes things like social
credit systems (for a particularly engaging version of which,
Whuffie, see Doctorow41) and the growing list of websites that
seek to tell us how trustworthy other people around us are.
Needless to say, there are problems here. The first and most
obvious is that the systems are not telling us anything about trust
per se, although they claim to, at least in some cases. What they
are giving us, if we pay attention, is a measure of reputation that
can, in most circumstances, be translated somehow to trustwor-
thiness for a given context (a web search, a dentist’s capabilities,
the publication prowess of an academic, or how far one can cy-
cle in the case of the Eddington number). While interesting, and
even useful when one is considering trusting the object for some
purpose, it is not how much you should trust that object. Unfor-
tunately, it stands the chance of becoming exactly that number.
Given that trust is something that individuals give, being told
what to give in any circumstance is not particularly informative,
especially since the reasons for that instruction are hidden in
the algorithms used, whichmay be inherently biased in any num-
ber of ways, nefarious or innocent.
We believe that empowerment is a much more human-ori-
ented way to manage the trust questions.
Trust Empowerment: ‘‘Here Is the Evidence You May
(Want to) Use’’
In trust empowerment, evidence is still gathered for trust-based
decisions, but explicit recommendations are not made. It is of
course the case that the evidence gathered may be implicitly
biased—the systems gathering the data gather it from specified
sources andmay choose to discount others—but the design of a
good system for trust empowerment would take into account the
evidence that the potential truster requests or requires in order to
make that trust decision. The end result is a technology that pre-
sents the truster with a set of evidence, potentially ranked in
terms of its own trustworthiness (which we get to shortly), and
simple questions: ‘‘Who do you want to trust to do this?’’ or
‘‘Which one do you trust more?’’, for example.
The difference between empowerment and enforcement in
this instance is striking: the person taking on the risk (the truster)
is informed and aware of what is being asked of them and has the
choice of what happens next.
Foreground trust38 is an example of this: a user online,
considering other humans online, is presented with the evi-
dence needed to make trust-based decisions about those
other people in a way that matters to them. This means that
the evidence given is that which matters to the person making
the trust decision. A specific value for trust is not given,
because in any trust decision, the trust that is given is that of
the individual truster, not the evidence gathering process.
Why is this important? If we consider that trust is putting one-
self into a situation or risk, then it should go without saying that4 PATTER 1, June 12, 2020the person taking on the risk should be the one who makes the
decision in as informed a way as possible (the technology or
the algorithm, in any case, takes on no risk).
We mentioned PageRank above. How might this look in an
empowered version? There is a process to be followed here.
The first is that the searcher is expected to provide some kind
of information about the things that matter to them (this needs
only to be done rarely, but in principle can be done every time
a search is made, because different searches are different con-
texts). The second is the search itself, and the result is pre-
sented, much as it is today, as a ranked list of possible hits,
with one exception: the reasons why they are hits are provided,
or how the results relate to the things that matter, including
matching keywords, matches for the kinds of pages that refer
to this one, or matches for relevant authors, for instance. Indeed,
the priorities of such metrics can be as personalizable as the
searches themselves. Is this more work for the searcher? Poten-
tially (probably!). But informed decision making can also be
achieved with a set of reasons why pages are ranked above
others, or products are recommended above others, and so
forth, which can come from similar sources. There is always
the problem of filter bubbles here, which is a widely researched
area (see for instance, Spohr42 and Dillahunt et al.,43 but this
barely scratches the surface, and which itself is open to discus-
sion44). We believe that part of the beauty of systems like this is
their ability to challenge the ways in which people think. Thus,
careful design is required to ensure that the searcher is not re-
warded simply with compliant results, but also with results that
encourage breadth of mind. This is an ongoing challenge for all
of the technology that is currently helping people.
Thoughts about Applications
We have come a long way in a short time. At the start of this pa-
per, we briefly mentioned some of the ways in which trust can be
put into play by those who work with data. In this section, we
explore in more detail the concepts of trust in data and what it
means, and very briefly explore trust of data, which is something
rather different. We also begin an exploration of the human-trust-
AI issue that is becoming increasingly important.
In all of these instances, the two questions we referred to
above are important. How the values of How much do you
have? and How much do you need? are calculated is different
in almost all cases, however, and we discuss that briefly here.
Trust in Data
In many ways, this is the simplest of our problems, and one that
has been extensively addressed (see for example, Penner and
Klahr45 and Aman46). This is because we inherently care about
the data we are using and how useful it might be. Thus, when
we consider data from sensor networks47 or shared among mo-
bile networks,48 we relate the validity of the data to the integrity of
the sources. This is, or should be, no different from trusting infor-
mation given to journalists,49,50 on social media sites,51 or other
kinds of information.9 The point here is that we need to examine
where the data came from, the routes the data may have taken,
the efficacy of the collection mechanisms, the sensors them-
selves (expected battery life, harsh environments, gaps in data,
and so forth).
Every one of these considerations is a data point in itself for our
two questions, and in particular for our first: How much do you
ll
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this question based on what matters to the individual because
the individual can tell the systemwhat is important to them about
the data (hence trust empowerment). To be fair, for human be-
ings it is often hard to decide what matters, how much, and
when, although in some of our work, we have explored different
ways of eliciting this information.38,52
The second question, How much do you need?, is answered
as straightforwardly by considering what the data are to be
used for, what is at risk, how much it matters, and so on.
Thus, for data being used to determine the amount of range
left on an electric vehicle in the summertime, we can be a little
less careful than with data from intensive care systems (or even
the same vehicle in the wintertime when temperatures are
30C or so and running out of power is a little more problem-
atic!). Context matters, and the second question aims to
capture it.
Trust in data can change because the answers to our two
questions can change. This changes how we perceive the
data, how we might use it, when we might use it differently,
and what we might use it for, even if the data are the same
from one moment to the next.
Trust of Data
A slightly more complex question puts into play the fact that a
single piece of data can be perceived as an entity in and of itself.
This is the concept of smart data,53,54 as well as, ultimately, the
premise behind information security (although generally with less
autonomy of data). The question is simple: does the data trust
the requester enough to share itself?
While again the answer to this question comes down to
answering our regular two questions, there is sometimes a
simpler way to explore this topic. Indeed, if we expect that
data belong to someone, we may say that the answer is a proxy
for whether or not the data owner trusts the requester. In this
case, what matters to the owner is what matters to the data.
As Maurer55 points out though, data may well have interesting
heredity and mixed up ownership, and this can complicate the
problem somewhat. That said, what we may say the data care
about is: how much, who, what for, how long, and why? The
work of Behrooz52 explored eliciting preferences from data
owners on mobile devices for how health data might be shared
and for what purpose, for instance.
With more autonomy of data (or the systems that police and
provide it), we can have much more nuanced and interesting an-
swers to our questions. Indeed, autonomous data can be much
more useful in different circumstances, because data may be
opened up for previously disallowed or questioned uses when
it is able to protect itself, redact itself, and police itself and its
use. We are beginning to see some examples in industry of
how this might look in practice (such as DataPassports and Im-
muta), but it remains early days, and data autonomy is in its in-
fancy but shows great promise.
Thoughts about Artificial Intelligence
The elephant in the room, if there is to be one, is AI. There are
many definitions of what AI is, and indeed many conceptions
about what it can, cannot, might, and even possibly should
and should not do (see for example, Brockman56 for a good
collection of essays, as well as Broussard,57 but the list of au-
thors discussing AI in many different ways, positive and nega-tive, is a long one and growing). We defer to Margaret Boden
for simplicity’s sake, and define AI as ‘‘computers doing the sorts
of things that minds can do.’’58, p. 1
Clearly, AI exists now, according to this definition, and we
believe that is apropos. Cars drive us around, medical systems
search for diagnoses, social media systemsmine data to predict
behaviors, and so on. There is a great deal of potential for the
things that such systems can do, and we are probably lucky
enough to be able to see more of them. The question of thinking
about trust with regard to such systems is complex, though.
What, exactly, are we trusting, and to what end? For the sake
of brevity, we address this quickly here, but there is a great
deal more to be done in this area, and the reader is referred for
example to Andras et al.59 for both discussion and further ref-
erences.
From a simple point of view, there are a couple of different
ways we can address this problem. The first is about under-
standing (and trusting) what AI tells us, trusting the decisions,
the deductions, and the actions AI might make. This particular
issue comes down to one of explainability. In the literature,1,39
a positive correlation has been found between trust and the
reduction of uncertainty, either in information or in user inter-
faces. Being able to explain automated decision making to the
user may (although there is no comprehensive study on this
yet) lead to the reduction of uncertainty. However, given the
complexity of machine-learning models, explaining them may
even contribute to higher uncertainties. Such explainability
may also bring about a certain level of trust enforcement in a
‘‘believe us because we can explain ourselves (even if you are
not able to understand our explanation)’’ fashion. The process
for empowerment for trust in AI, thus, remains an open research
challenge.
Almost certainly more controversial is the question of how AI
may trust us. In Marsh’s work16 for example, the concept of
agents trusting each other is at the forefront, and agents are
not taken to be simply artificial (so humans are in the frame).
Thus, we begin to think about how artificial systems may trust,
as well as be trusted by, humans. To be fair, this is not actually
as controversial as we might like to think, the specter of human
exceptionalism aside (we return to this shortly). Self-driving
cars continually check for the attention of the human driver, for
instance. Simple web browsers are most objectionable when
the human wants to visit a web site that has an expired certifi-
cate. Moreover, as Kaliouby60 points out, the AI really needs to
trust humans when it cannot accomplish the task it is supposed
to do (like drive straight, for instance). It is at such limit points that
humans, as liminal creatures, may be better than AI, but they had
better also be paying attention!
It is possible, just, to argue that the trust placed in AI by hu-
mans is a proxy trust, and that in fact we are trusting the people
who coded the AI. It is also possible to explore that retribution is
available for AI mistakes by punishing or holding to account the
individuals or the organizations that created the AI (cf. Bryson61).
The argument here is that AI is a tool and should be treated as
such. We may humbly disagree here and are beginning to
explore the way in which trust and trustworthiness, combined
with principles of restorative justice,62,63 may lead us to better in-
teractions with such systems (and each other). Of course, this all
begs questions around things like animism and (human)PATTER 1, June 12, 2020 5
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exploration of these issues, which are both historically troubling
in the instance of exceptionalism (the reader is encouraged to
consider racism, animal rights, and the environment, for
instance) and fraught with difficulties of labels of ‘‘primitive’’ or
‘‘uncivilized’’ for animism.64,65 It is, however, worth acknowl-
edging that much more discussion needs to take place and
indeed is taking place (for instance, with regard to the robots in
our midst66).
Aswe said earlier, the AI and trust question is complex, and un-
derstandably laden with a great deal of emotion. This is to be ex-
pected, and much more needs to be done to advance our under-
standing of ourselves as well as those who may be different from
us (we do not have an amazing track record here, and we should
learn better67) before we jump to conclusions about AI. To be
more succinct, it is not enough to consider AI as a threat or a
promise until we have started to consider how we should behave
when more complex and capable AI comes to be.
Final Thoughts about People
In this paper, we have discussed trust and what it is, and how it
might be useful. We have touched on some of the ways in which
it can be more specifically useful in the areas of data and AI. We
want to finish with something that could be seen as unrelated but
we hope will become clear.
When Alice shares her personal data with an organization for
the purpose of tracking her steps and running, or Bob shares
for the purpose of monitoring glucose levels online, or when
Charlie shares for the purpose of filing taxes, and when Dennis
shares his family’s pictures on Facebook, they do it for a reason.
That reason is sometimes very specific to them (for a particularly
erudite exploration of self-tracking, see Neff and Nafus68). The
reason is sometimes not quite what you might expect, and this
can color what is shared (and how). There are, to be sure, legal
and regulatory obligations in place for how the data are used,
when, buy whom and so forth, and when we insert trust into
the equation, this makes things much more interesting.
The key thing here is this: Alice, Bob, and company are in fact
people. This is ultimately a political statement. It is sometimes
easy to forget that this is the case when confronted with anony-
mized, pseudonymized, or otherwise anonymous data, but it is
the case. It is important to remember for several reasons.
Some are obvious. For example, people matter and can be
hurt. Some are less obvious. If we consider for instance who
owns the data, it is possible to get caught up in considerations
of parentage, for instance,55 which brings fascinating questions
about when data grow up and become their own ‘‘owner.’’
Finally, consider this: in order for people to share the data with
us, there is a question of trust, both that of the person and that
of the data itself. If either of those is lacking for the purpose,
ultimately everyone may lose. As Jordan notes, the digital econ-
omy, on which all of this data about people is based, is ‘‘ulti-
mately a vampire and must be staked by a democratised digital
culture.’’69, p. 171ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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